The Threat of Article 23 to Civil Liberties in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by Sansani, Inbal
Human Rights Brief
Volume 10 | Issue 3 Article 7
2003
The Threat of Article 23 to Civil Liberties in the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Inbal Sansani
American University Washington College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief
Part of the Foreign Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Human Rights Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sansani, Inbal. "The Threat of Article 23 to Civil Liberties in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region." Human Rights Brief 10,
no. 3 (2003): 28-31.
28
On February 26, 2003, the government of the HongKong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR orHong Kong) of the People’s Republic of China for-
mally introduced a preliminary draft of a controversial new
national security bill to Hong Kong’s legislature. Opponents
of the proposed legislation, including pro-democracy camps
within the Legislative Council, Hong Kong’s legislative body,
as well as local civil and human rights groups, fear that China
could use the new laws to suppress certain fundamental
rights and freedoms. Despite efforts to curtail dilution of
the national security measures proposed in the original draft,
following a three-month public consultation period and a
series of domestic and international protests, the bill still
poses a serious threat to civil liberties in the HKSAR. 
Background
The HKSAR, located on the southeastern coast of China,
consists of Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon Peninsula, and
the New Territories. The area constituting Hong Kong proper
consists of 236 islands and part of the Chinese mainland. On
July 1, 1997, China reclaimed Hong Kong, a territory that its
last feudal regime, the Qing Dynesty, ceded to Great Britain
at the end of the Opium War in the mid-1800s. The conver-
gence of two nations with a similar ethnic makeup but radi-
cally different political and economic systems has been the
subject of consistent international scrutiny. 
The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Future of
Hong Kong (Joint Declaration) insured that Hong Kong’s
1997 reversion to Chinese control after 155 years of British
colonial rule would not undermine its success as a major
trading, manufacturing, and industrial partner. The Joint
Declaration provides that Hong Kong will retain, for 50 years,
the same legal and economic systems, rights and freedoms,
and basic way of life that existed therein before the han-
dover of sovereignty. The treaty binds China to allow the peo-
ple of Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy—except in mat-
ters of defense and foreign affairs—under the twin dicta of
“One Country, Two Systems,” China’s policy, stemming from
former president Deng XiaoPing’s approach to the reincor-
poration of the Hong Kong lands and governmental system
under the umbrella of the People’s Republic of China, with
the goal of maintaining the status quo in this region. 
In 1990, China’s legislature, the National People’s Con-
gress, approved the Basic Law of the HKSAR, which entered
into force with the 1997 change of sovereignty. It serves as
Hong Kong’s “mini constitution,” ensuring the implemen-
tation of the basic policies contained in the Joint Declaration.
Subject only to China’s constitution, the Basic Law is the
supreme law of Hong Kong and functions as the territory’s
principal constitutional instrument. The Basic Law protects
individual rights and freedoms in two limited ways: (1) it
lists specific rights enjoyed by Hong Kong citizens; and (2)
it expressly incorporates the provisions of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Inter-
national Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), and international labor conventions. Article 39 of
the Basic Law provides this safeguard: “The rights and free-
doms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents shall not be restricted
unless as prescribed by law” of the HKSAR. 
The Chinese Government’s Introduction of Article 23 into the
Basic Law
After a million Hong Kong people demonstrated locally
in support of the pro-democracy movement at Beijing’s
Tiananmen Square in June 1989, China added Article 23 to
Hong Kong’s Basic Law. Article 23 requires that the HKSAR
“enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession,
sedition, and subversion against the Central People’s Gov-
ernment,” addressing issues of state secrets and the activities
of foreign political organizations in Hong Kong. Rather than
directly prohibiting treason, sedition, and subversion, or pre-
cisely defining these crimes, Article 23 mandates that the
HKSAR enact laws to define and penalize such actions.
Although acts constituting the crimes delineated in Article 23
have not been an issue in the HKSAR to date, the Hong
Kong government is nevertheless required to implement
laws to address these crimes under Article 23.
The Chinese government seems to have introduced
Article 23, at least in part, to avoid future anti-Chinese
demonstrations by the people of Hong Kong. Although the
original 1988 draft of Article 23 merely requested that Hong
Kong enact laws by February 1989 against “any act designed
to undermine national unity or subvert the Central People’s
Government,” the draft of Article 23 had evolved to include
both concepts familiar to Hong Kong’s common law system
and the constitutional requirement to implement national
security legislation— laws that “prohibit any act of treason,
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The National Security Statute drafted pursuant to the requirements of
Article 23 of the Basic Law was submitted on March 1, 2003 to the
Legislative Council for first and second readings, and has passed.
More than 20 council members from the Democratic Party, the Civil
Human Rights Front, and the Employee Union left the meeting before the
first reading to show their opposition. They burned a symbolic copy of the
Blue Bill (the current stage in the legislative process for Article 23) in the
parking lot outside the Legislative Council building.
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secession, sedition, or theft of state secrets.” The final draft
of Article 23, published in April 1990, nontheless, stipulates
that the HKSAR “enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of
treason, secession, sedition, and subversion against the Cen-
tral People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit
foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting
political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political
organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties
with foreign political organizations or bodies.”
Due to China’s generally dismal human rights record,
specifically the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre and the
subsequent promulgation of Article 23, the Hong Kong gov-
ernment enacted the Bill of Rights Ordinance in 1991. The
Bill of Rights compensates for inadequacies in the Basic Law’s
enumeration of individual rights by providing many addi-
tional rights and freedoms for Hong Kong residents. The
Bill of Rights reiterates almost verbatim the provisions of the
ICCPR, thereby making those enumerated rights directly
applicable to the citizens of Hong
Kong. The Bill of Rights combines with
the Joint Declaration and the Basic
Law to ensure that the provisions of
the ICCPR remain in force after the
1997 handover and are implemented
through Hong Kong domestic law. 
The HKSAR’s Proposals regarding
the Implementation of Article 23
On September 24, 2002, the gov-
ernment of the HKSAR published the
Consultation Document on Proposals to Implement Article
23 of the Basic Law (Consultation Document). Although
having the actual power to implement Article 23 is an impor-
tant aspect of the HKSAR’s autonomy, concern over the
necessity to implement Article 23 has plagued Hong Kong
since the Basic Law came into effect in July 1997 with the end
of British colonial rule. A three-month consultation period
with local NGOs and the general public followed the Con-
sultation Document’s introduction, after which the Hong
Kong government explained in a press release that it had care-
fully considered each submission. Secretary for Security
Regina Ip Lau Suk-Yee said that the submissions were classi-
fied into four categories, including: (1) submissions from orga-
nizations; (2) submissions from individuals; (3) submissions
in the form of standard letters and pre-printed opinion
forms; and (4) signature forms. 
Together with the subsequent legislative work, most notably
the introduction of draft bills to the Legislative Council
scheduled to occur between January and July 2003, the imple-
mentation of Article 23 represents one of the most important
constitutional developments in the HKSAR since its estab-
lishment more than five years ago. Indeed, the implemen-
tation of Article 23 is a major test of whether the concept of
“One Country, Two Systems” enshrined in the Basic Law can
be executed in a way that strikes a proper balance between
Beijing’s directives and the status of civil liberties enjoyed by
the population of the HKSAR. 
Criticisms of the HKSAR’s Proposals to Implement Article 23
Although for five years the government of the HKSAR
avoided the inevitable controversy that would surround the
introduction of legislation implementing Article 23, increas-
ing pressure from Beijing and the HKSAR’s legal obligation
to implement legislation caused the government to move
forward with the Consultation Document. Critics of the gov-
ernment’s approach to implementing Article 23 legislation
claim that the consultation exercise is incomplete in that
the Consultation Document outlines the government’s broad
policy and intentions in a lengthy document to which specific
responses are difficult to formulate. Opponents criticize the
glaring ambiguities in the Consultation Document and argue
that in the context of treason, secession, sedition, subversion,
theft of state secrets, and increased police powers, the small-
est errors in legal drafting or in the legal definitions provided
by the new laws can easily have draconian consequences. 
The government explains that implementing Article 23
would not compromise either the region’s liberal features or
laissez-faire economy. It argues that since Britain, Canada, and
the United States have legislation similar to Article 23, then
Hong Kong, as a part of China, should also have it. Opponents
to the implementation of a broad Article 23 argue that the
aforementioned countries balance comparable legislation
with democratic attributes including, inter alia, regular elec-
tions, a vibrant civil society, and a
powerful, free press, each of which
Hong Kong lacks. In theory, therefore,
any arbitrary application of anti-
sedition or subversion laws in those
countries would be subject to plausible
counter-pressures by one or all of the
available democratic elements. Addi-
tionally, the Hong Kong chapter of
Amnesty International posits the inclu-
sion of sedition as an example of the
excessive proposals to implement Arti-
cle 23. The organization claims that according to current legal
thought, sedition laws are archaic and unprincipled and are
no longer used in the majority of countries that have retained
sedition laws. 
The Scope of the Original Proposals to Implement Article 23
Although the government of the HKSAR is obligated to
implement Article 23, domestic and international human
and civil rights organizations are concerned with the scope
of the provisions as outlined in the Consultation Document.
The Consultation Document stemmed from existing Hong
Kong law as set out in the Crimes Ordinance (covering, inter
alia, treason and sedition), the Societies Ordinance (address-
ing activities of foreign political bodies in Hong Kong), the
Emergency Regulations Ordinance, and the Official Secrets
Ordinance. The Consultation Document included chapters
on treason, secession, sedition, subversion, theft of state
secrets, foreign political organizations, investigation powers,
and procedural matters. Although Article 23 recognized that
“the manner in which the state’s sovereignty and security are
protected in the Mainland and in the HKSAR may legiti-
mately differ,” the breadth and ambiguity of the proposals
drew significant international attention.
Another far-reaching example of the proposals to imple-
ment Article 23 can be found in the Hong Kong govern-
ment’s addition of a new mechanism for banning any orga-
nization “affiliated with a Mainland organization which has
been proscribed in the Mainland by the Central Authori-
ties, in accordance with national law on the ground that it
endangers national security.” The Hong Kong Human Rights
Article 23, continued from previous page
The organization claims that
according to current legal thought,
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unprincipled and are no longer used
in the majority of countries that have
retained sedition laws. 
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Monitor (HKHRM) labeled this proposal “sinister,” because
Article 23 does not reference links between organizations in
the HKSAR and mainland organizations. The HKHRM was
suspicious of the Hong Kong government’s inclusion of a
proposed restriction that the promulgation of Article 23
does not require.
A proposal to ban organizations on security grounds based
on a link with the Chinese mainland had the potential to per-
mit the Chinese government to ban any organization of
which Beijing disapproves. In addition, any branch of an
organization banned by China for state security reasons could
be banned in the HKSAR at any time, and the Hong Kong gov-
ernment was not even required to conduct any independent
investigation. This provision would have effectively made the
laws of the Chinese mainland applicable in the HKSAR.
According to the February 2003 draft law, any group of two
or more persons, regardless of location, will be considered a
“Mainland organization” if the group was formed or established
on the Mainland or its main place of business is in the main-
land. Further, a Hong Kong group is considered “subordinate”
to a “Mainland organization” if any of its policies are deter-
mined, directly or indirectly, by the “Mainland organization.” 
A main complaint of Hong Kong NGOs is that many of the
offenses outlined in the Consultation Document are ade-
quately covered by existing legislation, since Hong Kong’s cur-
rent laws already contain considerable regulations on the
seven crimes prohibited in Article 23. Therefore, most mem-
bers of Hong Kong’s legal and administrative communities
maintain that another anti-subversion law is unnecessary.
The Hong Kong government insists on passing the law, how-
ever, although the suggested definitions of the crimes are
ambiguous and could potentially create avenues for abuse.
Another major criticism of the HKSAR’s proposals is that
the concepts of government and country are confused and
used interchangeably in the proposed document. In a demo-
cratic country, citizens are empowered to monitor and check
the government, whereas the proposed enactment of Article
23 equates opposing the government with opposing the
country. In addition, speech deemed provocative may be
regarded as illegal in oral, written, and electronic forms.
People who express or hear such speech and fail to report it
would be regarded as complicit in the crime. Finally, the
law extends to Hong Kong permanent residents, regardless
of their current residence, as well as to people who are in the
HKSAR, regardless of their nationality, including people
who visit or transit through Hong Kong. The possible effects
of Article 23 are chilling in that its violation may result in as
much as a life term in prison.
Under the Article 23 legislative proposals, police powers
would also be expanded, enabling officers to enter and
search residential buildings, confiscate materials, and make
arrests at any time without a search warrant. Such practices
would not differ from the random searches practiced in
Mainland China. The human and civil rights community is
outraged by these proposals in part because, rather than
modernizing existing legislation, the Hong Kong govern-
ment has created new offenses such as sedition. In addition,
the implementation proposals have increased penalties for
offenses included in existing legislation, including greatly
increased prison sentences and unlimited fines.
The Legal Bases for Criticizing Proposals to Implement 
Article 23
Condemnations of the proposals for the implementation
of Article 23 are based on a few key instruments, most notably
the Joint Declaration and the ICCPR. For example, Article
3(5) of the Joint Declaration provides that HKSAR law ensures
rights and freedoms including, inter alia, those of the person,
speech, press, and association. A fundamental critique of
Article 23, therefore, is that its provisions are in breach of the
Joint Declaration because they apply legal concepts from
mainland China that are incompatible with the rights and free-
doms Hong Kong guarantees in Article 3(5). 
These provisions also violate Article 39 of the Basic Law
which stipulates that restrictions placed on the rights and free-
doms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents must not contravene
the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and international labor conven-
tions as applied to Hong Kong. Article 23 also requires that
the HKSAR prohibit, among other matters, “subversion
against the Central People’s Government.” Such a prohibi-
tion, however, would be contrary to ICCPR articles relating
to freedom of expression (Article 19) and association (Arti-
cle 21). Further, prohibition against subversion would con-
travene Article XIII of Annex 1 to the Joint Declaration,
which states that the HKSAR will protect the rights and free-
doms of inhabitants and other persons within the region, and
that the ICCPR and the ICESCR shall remain in force. Finally,
the proposals also run counter to the spirit of safeguarding
fundamental rights and freedoms as upheld in Hong Kong’s
Bill of Rights.
The HKSAR Government’s “Concessions” and 
“Clarifications”
Although the Hong Kong authorities do not admit that
some of the provisions first found in the Consultation Doc-
ument have been diluted,this has occurred as a result of
public pressure. On January 28, 2003, approximately one
month after the end of the three-month consultation period,
HKSAR Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa discussed the out-
come of the consultation exercise and assured the public that
after an extensive analysis and examination of the views
expressed during the period the Executive Council, Hong
Kong’s cabinet, had clarified certain legislative proposals
and delineated clear directions for the drafting work to
begin. The government plans to pass the legislation by July
2003. Despite Tung’s confidence that the rights and freedoms
of Hong Kong’s people will remain fully protected after the
enactment of laws promulgating Article 23, widespread reser-
vations continue to haunt a broad spectrum of organizations
in the HKSAR. In response to opinions expressed during the
consultation period, the government has decided to exempt
foreign nationals from prosecution for treason, for example,
and has also abolished the offense of seditious publication.
In an attempt to safeguard freedom of the press and the
free flow of information, the government has also limited the
definition of “unauthorized access” to protected informa-
tion, restricting it to access through criminal means such as
hacking, theft, or bribery. In a January 28, 2003 press release
outlining changes to the Consultation Document, Secretary
for Security Ip said that more precise definitions and clearer
concepts have been included in the implementation pro-
posals. For example, the government restricted the definition
of the crime of “levying war” under the offense of treason from
“a riot or insurrection involving a considerable number of peo-
ple for some general public purpose” to actual war or armed
30
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conflict. Further, the government abolished the offense of mis-
prision of treason, committed when a person knows that
another person has committed treason but fails to disclose this
information to the proper authority within a reasonable
amount of time. In its list of concessions, the government also
provided a clearer definition of a new class of protected
information originally entitled “relations between the Cen-
tral Authorities . . . and the HKSAR.” The new definition is
confined to information on matters concerning the HKSAR
that are within the responsibility of the Beijing Central
Authorities under the Basic Law. Moreover, disclosure of
such information would constitute an offense only if it is
damaging to the interests of national security. Although the
Article 23 clarifications released in late January were wel-
comed in Hong Kong business circles, pro-democracy legis-
lators and human rights activists dismissed the changes as min-
imal and maintained that the proposed law, despite its
changes, would ultimately violate the “One Country, Two
Systems” principle upon which the 1997 handover of sover-
eignty was based by outlawing local groups linked to organi-
zations banned in mainland China. Law Yu Kai, director of
HKHRM, criticized the concessions as minor, citing the pro-
posals as still insisting on the protection of national interest
“as a pretext to protect one-party rule in China.” 
Introduction of the Draft Bill to Hong Kong’s Legislative
Council
Although a blue paper containing the draft legislation was
issued to Hong Kong’s legislature on February 26, 2003, this
process excluded members of the public from voicing their
concerns. Prior to the bill’s introduction, leading democratic
politicians, lawyers, the Hong Kong Bar Association, and
newspaper editorials had all called for the government to
publish a white paper setting out the actual drafting of the new
legislation, including legal definitions. The government con-
sistently rejected this proposal. In response to the bill’s intro-
duction, Hong Kong’s Democratic Party is pushing for with-
drawal on the ground that it lacks public support. The limits
of public pressure are evident in the continued inclusion of
certain provisions in the proposed legislation. For example,
the original proposal to ban organizations based on a link with
the Chinese mainland on security grounds is more tightly
defined and subject to review by the courts, a check previously
missing. Albeit in a modified form, the legislation still allows
the Chinese authorities to use Beijing’s directives to ban an
organization on the Mainland as the basis for banning affili-
ated bodies in Hong Kong—without providing reasons for so
doing. The government of the HKSAR posits the fact that a
decision to impose a ban can be challenged in the courts as
a limiting test on the legislation’s power. However, the text of
the law shows that “the Court may order that all or any por-
tion of the public shall be excluded during any part of the hear-
ing,” thereby allowing secret court trials. Further, the text
states that a hearing can “take place without the appellant being
given full particulars of the reasons for the proscription” and
that the Court can “hold proceedings in the absence of any
person, including the appellant and any legal representative
appointed by him.” This manipulated access to the court sys-
tem undermines any sort of balance of the power of pro-
scription that a the right to a court hearing could have pro-
vided. The HKSAR government also “points to various tests that
would have to be met before a ban could be imposed, such as
being satisfied that it is necessary for national security.” It
does not seem difficult for government officials to convince
themselves that the appropriate standards for banning an
organization have been met; judiciaries everywhere are reluc-
tant to question governments on national security matters. 
Conclusion
Despite its willingness to modify other unpopular pro-
posals, the Tung administration’s refusal to abandon the
subversion law, which would empower the government of the
HKSAR to ban local organizations linked to organizations that
are outlawed on the mainland, calls into question the gov-
ernment’s claim that it is simply fulfilling its duty to imple-
ment Article 23. This particular proposal goes beyond what
Article 23 requires, strongly suggesting that Beijing, for the
first time since the 1997 handover, will gain power to play a
role in which groups are banned in the HKSAR. 
Beyond the consultation period and the current legislative
work occurring in the HKSAR, the context for this debate is
the Basic Law’s appeal for greater democratization, a goal that
requires serious attention by the local authorities. Hong
Kong has always been known for its rule of law, the inde-
pendence of its judiciary, the free flow of information, and
all of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Basic
Law. These freedoms have contributed to Hong Kong’s sta-
tus in the international community, and its appeal to investors.
Implementing the proposed Blue Paper for the implemen-
tation of Article 23 would quickly and definitively curtail
these freedoms. 
*Inbal Sansani is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.
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